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I. Introduction
Biotechnology companies rely heavily on strate-
gic alliances with pharmaceutical companies to
finance their research and development (R&D)
expenditures.1 In 1998, for example, biotech com-
panies raised three times as much ($6.2 billion)
from alliances with pharmaceutical companies as
from the private and public equity markets com-
bined (fig. 1). The share of biotechnology financ-
ing raised through alliances varies with the state of
equitymarkets. For example, in 1994, 1995, 1997,
and 1998, when biotech stock prices were rela-
tively low, biotech companies raised more money
from pharmaceutical alliances than from all other
sources combined. However, the continual flow of
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1. In this paper when we refer to a ‘‘biotechnology company,’’
we use the definition common among industry practitioners: a firm
that develops and markets drugs and was founded after Genentech
(1976). Genentech was the first company that aspired to produce
biologics (therapeutics derived from molecules present in the hu-
man body) rather than the chemical compounds being developed
by established pharmaceutical firms. In practice, many biotech
companies develop both biologics and chemical compounds, as do
most large pharmaceutical firms. In our empirical work, we try to
distinguish biologics from chemical compounds.
We examine the
determinants of
biotech-pharmaceutical
alliance prices to
determine whether the
market for alliances
is characterized
by asymmetric
information. We find
that inexperienced
biotech companies
receive substantially
discounted payments
when forming their first
alliance. A jointly
developed drug is more
likely to advance in
clinical trials than a drug
developed by a single
company, so the first-
deal discount is not
consistent with the
drug’s subsequent
performance. Biotech
companies receive
substantially higher
valuations from venture
capitalists and the public
equity market after
forming their first
alliance, which implies
that alliances send a
positive signal to
prospective investors.
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alliances, even in years when the public equity windows are ‘‘open,’’ such
as 1999, suggests that alliances with pharmaceutical firms create value
rather than functioning merely as a source of financing.
Considerable theoretical work has been done in the economics and
strategy literature examining why firms enter joint ventures (summarized
by Kogut 1988). The basic theory of the firm implies that firms form al-
liances when other firms have comparative advantage in certain functions.
In the case of the biotech-pharmaceutical industry, biotech firms pio-
neered new drug discovery technologies, which rely on microbiology
and genomics, whereas traditional pharmaceutical companies have su-
perior expertise in chemistry, which is essential for formulating drugs
from the lead compounds generated by drug discovery. Pharmaceuti-
cal companies generally are larger, have more experience, and possibly
economies of scale and scope in conducting clinical trials for safety and
efficacy, navigating the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval pro-
cess, manufacturing, and marketing and sales. Biotech-pharmaceutical
deals thusmay be a vehicle throughwhich firms exchange services, given
their different skills and expertise.
Large pharmaceutical companies rely increasingly on alliances to sup-
plement their drug pipelines. Of the 691 new chemical entities approved
by the FDA between 1963 and 1999, 38% were in-licensed (DiMasi
2000) In figure 2, we report the number of biotech alliances signed by the
20 largest pharmaceutical firms between 1988 and 1998.2 The average
Fig. 1.—Sources of R&Dfinancing at biotechnology companies (Source: Lerner and
Merges 1998; National ScienceBoard; Recombinant Capital; Burrill &Company). Data
on Alliance financing were not available for 1996.
2. The data in figure 2 are from Recombinant Capital and include certain types of deals
(e.g., platform technology deals) that are excluded from the sample used in our regression
analysis. The number of deals by stage in figure 2 is therefore different from table 1.
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number of biotechnology alliances signed per pharmaceutical firm per
year increased from 1.4 in 1988–90 to 5.7 in 1997–98. Early-stage (dis-
covery) deals far outnumber deals for compounds in later stages of de-
velopment. In 1997 and 1998, for example, discovery deals outnumbered
middle-stage (preclinical and phase 1) deals by 7 to 1, and late-stage
(phase 2 and phase 3) deals by 4 to 1. The preponderance of early-stage
deals may reflect the fact that there are simply more products at early
stages, before attrition for scientific or economic reasons. However, the
preponderance of early-stage deals is also consistent with the hypothe-
sis that the incremental value from codevelopment is greatest if alliances
are formed early in a drug’s life.3
An alternative, not mutually exclusive body of theory focuses on
imperfect information and the role of financial intermediaries that can
evaluate and signal to markets the quality of firms (Leland and Pyle
1977; Campbell and Kracaw 1980; Chan 1983; Chemmanur 1993; and
Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994). Pharmaceutical firms can be viewed as
performing a similar validating function. If investors (venture capitalists
and investment bankers) have less information than pharmaceutical firms
regarding the likely success of a biotech firm’s products and the quality of
its science and management, then by doing a deal with a pharmaceutical
3. The greater number of late- over middle-stage deals and their relatively low payments is
a puzzle (see Longman and Roche 1997). One possible hypothesis to explain this apparent bias
against middle-stage deals is that corporate structures lack a ‘‘champion’’ for middle-stage
deals. If such bias persists, it implies a significant, unexploited profit opportunity for com-
panies that seek out undervalued middle-stage deals. However, the conclusions on bias in
payment levels do not factor in differences in costs and risks by stage of deal, and recent trends
suggest that any prior bias may no longer exist. These issues are the subject of ongoing work.
Fig. 2.—Number of biotech alliances by phase and year for the 20 largest phar-
maceutical companies (Source: Recombinant Capital RDNA database).
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firm, a biotech firm can signal its quality to financial markets. If so, in-
experienced biotech firms that can benefit most from such validation
should bewilling to pay for it by accepting discounted alliance payments,
to be recouped by a subsequent increase in their market valuation when
they next raise private or public equity capital.
Previous literature on biotech-pharmaceutical alliances has been
largely empirical and provides mixed evidence on the extent of imperfect
information. Lerner and Merges (1998) examine the allocation of prop-
erty rights in biotech-pharmaceutical alliances, testing the theory devel-
oped by Aghion and Tirole (1994), who argue that property rights (e.g.,
responsibility for managing the clinical trials) should be assigned to the
R&D firm when the marginal impact of its effort on the product’s value
is greater than the marginal impact of the licenser firm’s financial invest-
ment. Lerner and Merges find evidence that biotech firms with more fi-
nancial resources retain a relatively large amount of the property rights,
which is consistent with efficient allocation of rights. However, Lerner
and Tsai (2000) find that deals signed during periods when it is difficult
for biotech firms to raise public or private equity assign more property
rights to the licensee (usually a pharmaceutical firm), and these alliances
are less likely to lead to a drug approved by the FDA. This suggests in-
efficiency in the allocation of rights, presumably resulting from imper-
fections in the market for financing biotech deals.4 Pisano (1997) finds
that drugs developed by biotech-pharmaceutical collaborations are less
likely to reach the market than drugs developed by a single firm, which
leads him to conclude that biotech companies use their informational
advantage to outlicense low-quality products. This suggests a persistent
information asymmetry between biotech and pharmaceutical firms lead-
ing to a lemons phenomenon in the market for deals.
None of these previous studies has examined how the magnitude of
biotech-pharmaceutical deal payments vary with the characteristics of
the product, characteristics of the buyer and seller firms, and the state
of equity markets—the principal alternative source of financing biotech
R&D. Furthermore, we are aware of no studies that examine whether
deals increase the market value of biotech firms, as suggested by a model
of asymmetric information and signaling.
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the market for deals
between biotech and pharmaceutical companies demonstrates evidence of
asymmetric information and, if so, to examine the nature and magnitude
of any biases. We begin by examining the association between deal pay-
ments, measured by total precommercial payments for in-licensed drugs,
and characteristics of the product (e.g., stage of development) and rights
4. An efficient approach would presumably adjust the size of deal payment, not the
allocation of rights, if relative bargaining power shifts; however, this assumes that financing
is available from other sources at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate.
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transferred; characteristics of the parties to the transaction, such as the
biotech firm’s prior experience negotiating deals; and the expected cost of
alternative financing.
We then examine the effect of deals on the valuation of biotech firms
in subsequent rounds of venture capital and public equity financing. If
pharmaceutical firms are better able than the financial markets to evaluate
the scientific and managerial expertise of private biotech companies, then
biotech firms that sign deals should receive higher valuations than other-
wise similar firms that develop their drugs independently, due to the posi-
tive signal provided by an alliance with an established pharmaceutical
firm.
In our final analysis, we test for information asymmetries in the deals
market by examining whether drugs that are developed in a biotech-
pharmaceutical alliance are less likely to succeed in clinical trials than
drugs developed by a single biotech firm. If so, this would tend to confirm
the ‘‘lemons’’ hypothesis suggested by Pisano’s (1997) findings: biotech
firms exploit their information advantage about the quality of their drug
candidates by out-licensing to pharmaceutical firms those that have rel-
atively poor prospects.
Our main finding in the analysis of deal prices is that biotechnology
companies signing their first deal receive a 47% discount relative to firms
that have signed at least two prior deals, controlling for product charac-
teristics and somemeasure of rights transferred, and that this discount is not
consistent with the postdeal performance of the drug. Thus, unlike Pisano
(1997), we find no evidence that out-licensed products are lemons. The
market valuation analysis shows that biotechs are able to recoup most of
this first-deal discount in subsequent financing rounds. The discount for
inexperience declines to 28% on a biotech firm’s second deal and is insig-
nificant for subsequent deals. These findings are consistent with asymmet-
ric information in financial markets, such that pharmaceutical companies
are better able than money managers to evaluate the scientific and mana-
gerial expertise of private biotech firms. However, the fact that alliances
occur even between well-established biotech and pharmaceutical firms
suggests that signaling is not the sole function of biotech-pharmaceutical
alliances; deals, on average, create positive incremental value due to the
exchange of different skills. We attempt, to the extent possible, to distin-
guish the signaling and the value-added motivation for deals.
II. Models of the Market for Deals between Biotech
and Pharmaceutical Companies
A. Perfect Information: The Gains-from-Trade Model of Deals
To provide a benchmark for deal valuations where information may be
asymmetric, it is helpful to begin by characterizing a well-functioning
1437Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances
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market for deals, which includes many potential sellers (usually, and
hereafter, biotech companies) of promising drug candidates, many po-
tential buyers (usually, and hereafter, pharmaceutical companies) for any
drug candidate; symmetric and unbiased information regarding the qual-
ity of the drugs and partnering capabilities of firms, among biotech com-
panies, pharmaceutical companies, venture capitalists, and other money
managers; and no liquidity constraints, so that biotech companies can raise
sufficient capital at appropriately risk-adjusted rates. Under such condi-
tions, potential buyers and sellers separately calculate the value of a drug
as the discounted present value of its expected cash flows.
The expected net present value (V0) of a drug currently in the pre-
clinical stage (0), assuming that it will be developed by the biotech
company that originated the drug, is
½V0jd ¼ 0 ¼
p0p1p2p3R
ð1þ rÞ4


C0 þ
p0C1
1þ r þ
p0p1C2
ð1þ rÞ2
þ p0p1p2C3
ð1þ rÞ3

; ð1Þ
where the subscripts 0, 1, 2, and 3 refer to the preclinical, phase 1, phase 2,
and phase 3 development stages, d is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a
drug is developed jointly by a biotech and pharmaceutical firm under an
alliance, p is the phase-specific probability a drug advances from a particular
stage, C is the phase-specific R&D cost, R is the value of the commercial
cash flows (net of manufacturing, marketing costs, and any postlaunch R&D
expenses) discounted to the first year of sales, and r is the discount rate. Each
development stage is assumed to last 1 year for sake of simplicity, although
in reality the mean duration varies by development stage. Values of p, C, and
R may differ across firms, due to differing expertise, and may differ across
therapeutic categories and types of products (e.g., biologics versus chemical
compounds).
If this drug advances to phase 1, its value (V1) becomes
½V1jd ¼ 0 ¼
p1p2p3R
ð1þ rÞ3


C1þ
p1C2
1þ r þ
p1p2C3
ð1þ rÞ2

: ð2Þ
The value V1 typically exceeds V0 for three reasons. First, as a drug advances
from discovery to clinical trials to regulatory approval, the scientific risk that
it will fail safety and efficacy tests usually decreases; hence, the probability
that it will be commercialized usually increases.5 Second, projected re-
venues become more imminent as commercialization approaches and are
discounted less heavily. Third, as a drug develops, more R&D costs become
5. The probability that the FDA will approve a drug could conceivable decrease as the
drug advances if a company discovers potential side effects that are not substantial enough to
merit discontinuing development but are substantial enough to cause a downward revision in
the approval probability.
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sunk. Therefore, V0 and V1, as defined in equations (1) and (2) can be viewed
as the reservation price or the minimum asking price of a seller, substituting
its specific values for the parameters.
Consider now the maximum amount that a pharmaceutical company
would be willing to pay for this drug, assuming that it would assume
all subsequent costs. If the pharmaceutical company has the same prob-
abilities, revenue, and cost estimates as the biotech company, V1 also
reflects the amount that the buyer-pharmaceutical company would be
willing to pay for this drug in phase 1. With competitive entry into the
development of drug candidates, the initial expected net present value
(V0) for the marginal drug should be zero. The expected net present value
of a phase-1 product (V1) is positive by an amount that reflects the costs
and risk already incurred by the biotech company. Similarly, V2 for a
phase-2 product is higher by an amount that reflects the additional costs
sunk and the incremental probability the drug will be commercialized.
Thus, under the assumptions of symmetric information, the value of deals
signed at successive phases should increase by an amount that reflects the
incremental costs and risks incurred. This conclusion assumes no differ-
ence in assignment of rights, in the type of products involved, or in the
structure of deals by stage of development.6
With identical costs and capabilities between firms there would be no
rationale for doing deals, even with perfect information. The gains-from-
trade or comparative-advantage theory of deals assumes that, if an ex-
perienced pharmaceutical firm works with a biotech company, some of
the development costs will be lower or expected revenues will be higher.
In particular, a pharmaceutical firm may potentially increase p due to
greater experience in managing clinical trials, decrease C due to econ-
omies of scale and scope, or increase R due to its large and experienced
sales force. In that case, the value of a phase-1 drug if codeveloped by the
pharmaceutical firm ðV1jd ¼ 1Þ exceeds its value if developed solely
by the biotech firm ðV1jd ¼ 0Þ. The actual deal payment is between
V1jd ¼ 1 and V1jd ¼ 0, depending on the how the incremental value of
codevelopment is shared, which in turn depends on the firms’ relative
bargaining power.
The profit-maximizing strategy for a biotech firm is to develop a drug
in-house or select a stage of development in which to form an alliance,
according to which alternative yields the highest discounted present
value. The gains-from-trade model predicts that a necessary condition
6. Deal payments may also vary by stage of deal if the assignment of responsibilities,
rights, and costs differ by deal stage. For example, for predevelopment deals (prior to the
start of human clinical trials), a pharmaceutical company may incur some or all of the costs
of clinical trials and would usually bear most manufacturing and marketing costs. If the deal
is signed late in phase 3, however, the biotech company has already built substantial man-
ufacturing capability and may participate in postlaunch manufacturing and marketing, shar-
ing some of these costs in return for a larger share of drug revenues.
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for a biotech firm to sign a preclinical deal is that the expected value of
the drug in an alliance ðV0jd ¼ 1Þ exceeds its expected value if devel-
oped independently ðV0jd ¼ 0Þ, and exceeds the expected value of the
drug if a deal were signed at a later stage ðV1jd ¼ 1;V2jd ¼ 1, and
V3jd ¼ 1Þ.7
In the perfect-informationmodel, when a biotech firm signs a deal with
a pharmaceutical firm, there should be no effect on the biotech’s market
value. Venture capitalists and other investors should have anticipated the
incremental value of codevelopment when determining the company’s
value in the previous financing round.
B. Imperfect Information: The Signaling Model of Deals
We now relax the assumptions of a well-functioning market for biotech-
pharmaceutical deals and analyze the implications of market imperfec-
tions on the type of deals, deal payments, and the performance of drugs
developed in biotech-pharmaceutical alliances. Consider first asymmet-
ric information: prospective buyers ( pharmaceutical firms) and investors
(venture capitalists) may have less information than prospective sellers
(biotechs) regarding the quality of a biotech company’s drugs and the
competence of its management. This information asymmetry could be
particularly severe in the preclinical phase, before empirical evidence on
the drug’s safety and clinical efficacy are available.
We adapt to the biotech-pharmaceutical setting a model that Campbell
and Kracaw (1980) use to explain the role of financial intermediaries as
signalers of high-quality firms. Specifically, we assume high-quality (H )
and low-quality (L) biotech firms produce high- and low-quality drug
candidates, respectively.8 The expected discounted net present value of
a high-quality drug exceeds that of a low-quality drug at all development
stages ðVH >VLÞ due to superior scientific characteristics or superior
managerial skill or effort. Biotech firms know the quality of their drug
candidates but cannot convey this information credibly to pharmaceuti-
cal firms and equity investors. If there is no mechanism to signal quality,
the only possible equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium: high-quality and
low-quality biotech firms are both valued at VF rather than the values
commensurate with the quality of their drug portfolios, VFH and V
F
L . Here
the superscript F refers to the firm as a whole, so VF is the sum of the
7. This is a necessary not a sufficient condition for a deal if some potential deals fail due
to disagreement over sharing the incremental value from codevelopment. It is also possible
that biotech companies accept less than the value-maximizing terms on one drug to partic-
ipate in on-the-job training from sharing manufacturing or marketing with an experienced
pharmaceutical firm.
8. The qualitative predictions of this model would be the same if we adopted the more
realistic assumption that high- and low-quality firms generate drugs from two different qual-
ity distributions rather than drugs with different discrete quality measures.
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expected value of all drugs in a firm’s portfolio as determined by equity
investors.
Although high-quality biotech firms would be willing to pay an
amount up to VHF  VF to have their quality identified, Grossman (1976)
and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) show that there may be insufficient
incentives to invest in information production in markets with asym-
metric information regarding asset quality. When information is a pub-
lic good and incorporated instantly into the market prices of assets, the
organization incurring the cost of distinguishing high- and low-quality
assets cannot appropriate the benefits of information production because
the values of high-quality assets rise when they are identified as such.
Furthermore, even if high-quality biotech firms could make side pay-
ments to compensate the signaling firm for its costs, there remains a
moral hazard problem: the signaling firm could collect the payment with-
out actually producing accurate information unless there is an effective
commitment device.
The market for deals between biotech and pharmaceutical firms
appears to offer a mechanism by which biotech firms can compensate
pharmaceutical firms for information production costs and pharmaceu-
tical firms have incentives to be truthful. When pharmaceutical firms
license drugs from biotech firms and agree to share the development costs
and revenues, they have an incentive to evaluate the quality of the asset
they are acquiring, which mitigates the moral hazard problem.9 The mar-
ket for deals also allows biotech firms to compensate pharmaceutical
firms for information costs by allowing pharmaceutical firms to subtract
these costs from the deal payments.
A number of theoretical studies in the finance literature examine the
role ofintermediaries in signaling firm quality, but to our knowledge none
of the theories has been tested empirically. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue
that the appropriability and moral hazard problems ‘‘can be overcome if
the firm gathering the information becomes an intermediary, buying and
holding assets on the basis of its specialized information.’’ This seems to
describe exactly the role of pharmaceutical firms in searching for drugs to
in-license. In their model, the signal of a firm’s quality is the fraction of
equity retained by the entrepreneur. In Campbell and Kracaw (1980), the
moral hazard problem is resolved if the information-producing interme-
diary has a sufficiently large stake in the market and thus incentives to in-
vest an efficient amount in information production and report it truthfully.
Chemmanur (1993) argues that high-value firms compensate investment
9. Full elimination of incentives for underinvestment in information by the signaling
firm requires outright purchase of the asset, but this might increase moral hazard by the
seller. The fact that deals generally stipulate that the parties share costs and revenues could
be a second-best way to deter moral hazard by both parties; it also suggests that gains
from collaboration outweigh the suboptimal incentives and moral hazard created by sharing
contracts.
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banks for their information production costs by underpricing their initial
public offering, and investment banks have incentives to generate credible
information tomaintain their reputation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994).
Finally, Chan (1983) shows that the presence of an informed intermediary
can affect the quality of assets in the market and increase social welfare
rather than merely redistribute wealth from over- to undervalued firms.
Applying these models, we assume that pharmaceutical firms and
venture capitalists incur search costs, S, to discern a drug’s expected net
present value; and these costs can vary by stage of development. Phar-
maceutical firms have a comparative advantage in information produc-
tion due to their superior scientific and commercial knowledge relative to
venture capitalists and other investors. Part of S is dedicated to identi-
fying the competence of the biotech firm’smanagement, since the biotech
company is integral to developing the drug, and part to identifying the
specific drug’s quality. The former cost ise incurred only as long as it
takes prospective buyers to discern a firm’s managerial quality, while the
latter cost occurs with each deal. We consider four scenarios regarding
the incremental value of codevelopment relative to the cost of producing
information and the magnitude by which high-quality biotech firms are
undervalued in a pooling equilibrium.
In the first scenario, the incremental value of codevelopment for
high- and low-quality drugs ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼ 0 and VLjd ¼ 1
VLjd ¼ 0Þ exceeds S, so both high- and low-quality biotech firms sign
deals. If there are a large number of prospective buyers relative to sellers,
high-quality biotech firms receive payments of VHjd ¼ 1 S, and low-
quality firms receive payments of VLjd ¼ 1 S.10 A biotech firm con-
sidered by pharmaceutical firms to be of high quality should receive
higher payments from subsequent deals (relative to its first deal) because
it needs to compensate the pharmaceutical firm only for the drug-specific
information production costs. The number of deals required to signal a
firm’s quality type is an empirical question that we examine.
Although both types of biotech firms sign deals, we assume there still
is a separating equilibrium, because venture capitalists can identify the
quality of a biotech firm from the magnitude of the deal payment. That is,
we assume venture capitalists can distinguishVHjd ¼ 1 S fromVLjd ¼
1 S. As a result, biotech firms are valued appropriately ðVFH and VFL Þ
in the subsequent financing round (either follow-on venture capital fi-
nancing or an initial public offering). The market value of high-quality
biotech firms increases byVHF  VF following a deal and themarket value
of low-quality biotech firms decreases by VF  VLF. Low-quality firms
do not develop their drugs independently if venture capitalists know the
10. Later, we discuss the possibility that the gains from codevelopment may accrue
wholly or in part to the pharmaceutical firm, if there are few buyers relative to sellers, so the
biotech firms receive payments of VLjd ¼ 0 S rather than VLjd ¼ 1 S.
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incremental value of codevelopment is large enough to compensate a
pharmaceutical firm for its search costs. If a low-quality biotech forgoes
signing a deal to try to maintain its overvalued status, the venture capi-
talists infer the biotech firm has low-quality drugs. Knowing this, the
biotech signs codevelopment deals and incurs the reduction in value.
In the second scenario, we assume that ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼ 0Þ >
S > ðVLjd ¼ 1 VLjd ¼ 0Þ. A pharmaceutical firm’s cost of evaluating
an inexperienced biotech company exceeds the incremental value of co-
development for low-quality drugs but is less than the incremental value
of codevelopment for high-quality drugs. Only high-quality biotech
firms are able to compensate pharmaceutical firms for the search costs, so
only high-quality firms sign deals and receive payments of VHjd ¼
1 S.11 The market value of high-quality biotech firms increases by
VFH  VF following a deal, and the value of biotech companies that have
a drug candidate but do not sign a deal falls by VF  VFL .
The third scenario is similar to the second scenario: ðVLjd ¼ 1
VLjd ¼ 0Þ < S; ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼ 0Þ < S; and ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼
0Þ þ ðVFH  VFÞ > S. Pharmaceutical search costs are larger than the
incremental value of codevelopment, but high-quality biotech firms can
compensate pharmaceutical firms from the subsequent increase in value
once venture capitalists receive the quality signal. As in scenario 2, only
high-quality firms sign deals and firms are correctly valued at the next
financing round. Note that capital market imperfections may prevent
high-quality biotech firms from borrowing enoughmoney to compensate
pharmaceutical firms for their search costs, preventing the formation of
alliances.
In the final scenario, no deals are signed because ðVLjd ¼ 1 VLjd ¼
0Þ < S; ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼ 0Þ < S; and ðVHjd ¼ 1 VHjd ¼ 0Þ þ
ðVFH  VFÞ < S. Although this scenario is clearly not borne out in the
market because we observe many deals, it highlights another way that
information costs could affect the market for alliances. In scenarios 2 and
3, low-quality biotech firms continue to develop their drugs indepen-
dently rather than sign deals due to the high information costs. It is pos-
sible that the cost to pharmaceutical firms of identifying the quality of
a drug (and the quality of a biotech firm) might be substantially smaller
once the drug has completed phase 1 or phase 2 trials and more infor-
mation is available. For example, consider a situation where ðVL;0jd ¼
1 VL;0jd ¼ 0Þ < S0 when a drug is in the preclinical stage, but once the
drug reaches phase 2 trials, ðVL;2jd ¼ 1 VL;2jd ¼ 0Þ > S2, where the
subscripts 0 and 2 refer to the preclinical stage and stage 2, respectively.
11. The payment to the biotech firm may be somewhat less than VHjd ¼ 1 S if the
pharmaceutical firm has to incur some search costs to determine that a firm or product is of
high value. The lower payment to high-quality firms would compensate the pharmaceutical
firm for the risk that a firm will turn out to be of low quality.
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In this case, we expect the quality of drugs involved in later-stage deals to
be lower than the quality of drugs involved in preclinical deals. Later-
stage deal payments appear to be biased downward in a naı̈ve analysis,
but this is due to unmeasured quality. This model predicts that companies
signing their first deal on a late-stage drug receive relatively low pay-
ments due to low unmeasured quality.
In the empirical analysis, we attempt to identify whether the actual
market for deals is consistent with scenario 1, 2, or 3 (with the latter two
scenarios being empirically indistinguishable); scenario 4 is clearly re-
jected by the evidence on the number of deals. One method of dis-
tinguishing the scenarios is to examine the impact of deals on biotech
company valuations. If scenario 1 prevails, both types of companies sign
deals. The effect of a deal on a biotech company’s valuation is ambig-
uous: it depends on the proportion of biotech companies that are high
quality, and the magnitude of the over- versus the undervaluation. In
scenarios 2 and 3, only high-quality firms sign deals, which causes
investors to bid up the value of high-quality firms from VF to VFH . Thus, a
positive relationship between a deal and subsequent appreciation in a
company’s value is a necessary but not sufficient condition to prove the
relevance of scenario 2 or 3.
Another way to distinguish scenario 1 from scenarios 2 and 3 is to
examine differences in deal payments according to the stage of a drug’s
development. If search costs exceed the benefits of codevelopment for at
least some firms, low-quality drugs aremore likely to be out-licensed at later
stages of development, when information costs are relatively low. Deal pay-
ments involving drugs in later stages of development therefore are rela-
tively low due to unmeasured drug quality. The data prevent us from testing
this hypothesis conclusively, but we present some tentative evidence.
In all scenarios of the signaling model, payments to a biotech firm for
its first deal (and possibly later deals) are relatively low, to compensate
the pharmaceutical firm for information costs. An alternative, and not
necessarily mutually exclusive, explanation for a first-deal discount is
that biotech firms learn; codevelopment with a pharmaceutical firm adds
more value for relatively inexperienced biotech firms. If pharmaceutical
firms capture most of this incremental value due to bargaining power,
then deal payments are relatively small for inexperienced biotech firms.
In both the gains-from-trade and signaling models, deals occur only
after a pharmaceutical firm has invested in information regarding the qual-
ity of the biotech company and the drug. These models predict that there
will be no lemons problem: biotech firms cannot out-license inferior prod-
ucts. We test this prediction by examining whether drugs out-licensed by
biotech firms are less likely to complete clinical trials and be approved by
the FDA relative to drugs that biotech firms develop independently.
The imperfect information model has focused on asymmetric infor-
mation. Another possible imperfection is market power due to small
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numbers. Specifically, there may be few buyers relative to sellers for the
numerous preclinical drugs and few sellers relative to potential buyers for
late stage products, due to the attrition of drug candidates or inadequate
planning by buyers. Moreover, buyers of late-stage deals may have a
more inelastic demand if product failures create gaps in a pharmaceutical
firm’s product pipeline. If sellers have greater relative bargaining power
for late-stage products, late-stage deals would have relatively high prices,
even after adjusting for differences in cost and risk.
Another possibility we examine is that capital market imperfections
may affect the market for deals. Deals and equity are alternative sources
of financing R&D, so biotech firms should select the least expensive
financing source.When the public and private equity markets are ‘‘closed,’’
deal values may be low relative to when it is inexpensive for biotechs to
raise private and public equity.
Figure 1 presents data on the amount of public and private equity
raised by biotechnology companies between 1991 and 1999. Three times
during this period—1991, 1996, and 1999—investors were attracted to
the biotechnology industry and these companies raised a substantial
amount of public equity. However, there were also periods when it was
difficult or extremely costly for biotech firms to raise equity. At such
times, alliances with pharmaceutical companies may be a relatively at-
tractive way to raise money. Figure 1 supports this hypothesis: alliance
funding is relatively high when total equity funding is relatively low.
In years when the public equity market is tight, the supply of deals in-
creases, and one would expect the mean deal price to decrease, other
things equal. This prediction may be offset if the biotech firms are forced
to sign deals on their highest-quality drugs during tight equity markets.
If imperfections in the financial markets create liquidity constraints, a
biotech company with a weak balance sheet might be forced to accept
early-stage offers because it lacks the financial resources to develop a
drug independently. To test this, we include in the empirical analysis the
financial strength (measured as the value of equity plus debt) of a biotech
company. Our hypothesis is that, controlling for drug characteristics, deal
payments vary inversely with the market value of the biotech company.
III. Empirical Method
A. Determinants of Deal Payments
We examine the determinants of the deal prices for drugs that are sold
or licensed, usually from biotech to pharmaceutical companies, to see if
inexperienced biotech firms implicitly pay pharmaceutical firms for the
cost of producing information and whether prices are affected by other
possible market imperfections. Equation (1) implies that deal prices must
be adjusted for variations in scientific risk and development costs by stage
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of development and for expected revenues, which depend on the size and
competitive structure of the target market. Using ordinary least squares,
we regress the logarithm of the price ðPijtÞ that firm j receives by licensing
drug compound i in year t on product characteristics and the structure of
the deal ðXiÞ, characteristics of the selling firm ðFjÞ, characteristics of the
buying firm ðFkÞ, and characteristics of the equity market for biotech
firms (M) at the time of the deal (t):
logðPijtÞ ¼ g0 þ ;1Xi þ ;2Fjt þ ;3Fkt þ ;4Mt þ "ijt ð3Þ
We assume that the random disturbances ("\varepsilon) r normally distributed con-
ditional on the observed covariates, have a mean of zero, and arise because
the two parties to the alliance observe drug characteristics that we do not
(e.g., expected efficacy of the drug). We include in X indicator variables for
the drug’s therapeutic class (a rough proxy for market size and any other
class-specific costs or risks), indicator variables for the drug’s development
stage at the time of the deal (discovery-preclinical, phase 1, phase 2, phase
3), and an indicator for whether the drug is a biologic product.12 We also
include separate indicator variables if the seller retained commercial rights to
the drug for the U.S. or Japanesemarket, whether the buyer purchased equity
in the seller firm as part of the deal, and reverse licensing deals.13
We include in Fjt a series of indicator variables to measure the seller’s
experience, using the number of deals the seller has signed prior to the
deal being examined. The coefficients on these indicator variables (e.g.,
biotech has signed one prior deal or biotech has signed two prior deals) in
the signaling model measure the decline in S, the pharmaceutical firm’s
cost of evaluating a drug, as information accumulates regarding the
biotech firm’s managerial capabilities. In the gains-from-trade model, the
experience variables measure the change in the incremental value of co-
development as a biotech firm learns.
Conditional on prior deal experience, a small selling firm might be
willing to accept a lower deal price if it can benefit from a positive signal
associated with an alliance, particularly if the licensee is a large estab-
lished firm. A large buying firm might be able to negotiate lower deal
prices due to experience or specialized skills; on the other hand, a large
buyer might be willing to pay higher prices to in-license drugs if there are
substantial economies of scale or scope in R&D. We include firm sizes,
measured as the enterprise value for public companies (market value of
12. We consider a drug to be a biologic if the originating firm focuses on large molecules
or antibodies.
13. The data available to us are insufficient to estimate a complete model, which would
treat the rights transferred and the stage of the drug at the time of the deal as simulta-
neously determined with the deal payment. We assume here that these other deal terms
are predetermined. Our estimates thus reflect deal values conditional on these other deal
characteristics.
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the equity plus book value of debt) and the post-money valuation at the
most recent round of venture capital financing for private firms. The
expected sign on the size of the buyer is ambiguous a priori.
Lerner and Tsai (2000) show that biotechnology companies transfer a
greater number of property rights (e.g., control of the clinical trials) to
pharmaceutical companies when it is difficult or expensive to raise money
from public and private equity markets. However, a more efficient ad-
justment to a shift in bargaining power would be for biotech companies
to accept smaller deal payments when equity financing is expensive. We
include the amount of funds raised by biotechnology companies from pub-
lic and private equity markets in each year, indexed relative to a base year
(1996) to measure the state of the equity markets. To test whether small
biotech companies are particularly vulnerable when the equity markets are
‘‘closed’’ or equity financing is expensive, in some specifications, we in-
teract the equity index with the selling firm’s enterprise value.
The data available on biotech-pharmaceutical company deal prices are
not ideal for testing whether prices paid at certain stages of drug devel-
opment are systematically biased, after controlling for costs, risks, and
the characteristics of drugs. Since we lack good estimates for these pa-
rameters, our conclusions regarding bias in deal prices by stage of de-
velopment are preliminary and approximate. Similarly, we lack the data
to test whether biotech firms with low-quality drugs are forced to sign
late-stage deals, when information costs are lower. This would require
showing that deal payments for late-stage drugs are too low given the
relatively high probability of reaching the market and the magnitude of
sunk development costs relative to early-stage drugs. Deal payments
typically include several components, including up-front payments of
cash and investments in the selling firm’s equity, milestone payments
(payments conditional on the drug achieving certain designated events),
sponsored research payments (usually a fixed amount per Ph.D. scientist
assigned to perform research on the drug), postcommercial payments
(usually a royalty percent of gross sales), and sometimes a ‘‘quid’’ in the
form of rights to another product from the buyer. A complete evaluation
of the deal value requires data on each of these components, the rights
and responsibilities transferred and retained (e.g., territories and thera-
peutic categories covered), and the probabilities that contingent pay-
ments will be made.
The valuation data available to us are the total potential precommercial
payments from the buyer to the seller, where potential refers to the
scenario where all contingent payments are made. This figure thus in-
cludes up-front payments, sponsored research payments, investments in
the selling firm’s equity as if it were cash, and any potential milestone
payments. The total potential precommercial payment excludes post-
commercial royalty payments, any cost sharing, and the value of any
product swaps. Since this total precommercial measure of the deal value
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incorporates milestone payments as equivalent to cash, without dis-
counting for uncertainty or the time value of money, we expect it to be
invariant by stage, except to the extent that any of the following differ
by the stage of the deal: (1) the rights transferred, (2) bargaining power,
(3) the absolute amount of the total deal value that is paid in precom-
mercial versus royalty payments, and (4) the quality of products traded.
B. Effect of Deals on Firm Valuations
To test the signaling model, we examine the impact of deals on the
valuations that private biotech firms receive from venture capitalists and
the broader set of investors when the company goes public. Specifically,
we regress the value of biotech company j after the nth round of financ-
ing ðYjnÞ on an indictor variable that equals 1 if the company had signed
one deal prior to the financing round nðD1nÞ, and an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the company had signed two or more such deals prior to
financing round nðD2þn Þ:14
logðYjnÞ ¼ a0 þ a1D1jn þ a2D2þn þ?3Tt þ?4Nn þ ujn; ð4Þ
where the random disturbances (u) capture the value of unmeasured firm
characteristics. The market value of a firm is defined as the product of its
shares outstanding and the price per share at the conclusion of a private-
equity financing round or at the time of the initial public offering (IPO).
Separate indicators are included for the each round of venture capital fi-
nancing and the company’s initial public offering (n) and the year (t) in
which the financing occurred. The financing round variables measure the
market value of a firm’s experience.
In scenario 1 of the signaling model described in Section II, the in-
cremental value of partnering is large relative to the cost of distinguish-
ing high- from low-quality biotech firms, so both high- and low-quality
biotech firms sign early-stage deals. In this scenario, a1 (and a2) could
be positive or negative, depending on the number of high- versus low-
quality biotech firms that sign deals and the magnitude of under- and
overvaluation in the pooling equilibrium that prevailed before deals were
signed. In scenarios 2 and 3, only high-quality biotech firms sign early-
stage deals, so a1 measures VFH  VFL , the difference in the market value
of high- and low-quality biotech companies once the quality signal has
been received. In the gains-from-trade model, a1 (and a2) is predicted to
be zero if the deal values on average are equal to the value of assets
transferred; it is positive only if sellers on average capture some of the
incremental value created by the alliance and the incremental value of the
deal is not already anticipated by equity markets.
14. We adjust the standard errors to allow the errors to be correlated over time for a
particular firm.
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One criticism of equation (4) is that a1 and a2 might not measure the
incremental signal value of a deal’s announcement only but also any
characteristic correlated with a firm’s value that is unobserved to the
analyst but observed by venture capitalists. For example, firms with
capable managers and scientists might produce high-quality drugs, sign
deals with pharmaceutical firms, and receive relatively high valuations
from venture capitalists, but this does not imply a causal relationship for
the deal signal.
To focus on the incremental value of the deal announcement, we also
estimate a first-difference version of equation (4) that eliminates any
time-invariant, unobserved firm characteristic, such as the quality of a
company’s science. Specifically, we regress the percentage change in a
biotech company’s value between financing round n  1 and n on an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the company signed its first deal be-
tween these two financing rounds ðD1j;n n1Þ, an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the company signed a deal between these two financing rounds
and it had already signed a deal prior to round n  1 (both Dj;n n1 and
Dj;n1 are equal to 1), and indicator variables for the financing round and
the year in which the financing occurred:
logðYj;nÞ  logðYj;n1Þ ¼ b0 þ b1D1j;n n1 þ b2D1j;n n1Dj;n1
þ @3Nn þ @4Tt þ h jn ð5Þ
We also include a continuous variable for the number of months between
the successive financing rounds. A positive coefficient on the deal variable
in this specification provides strong evidence that the change in a firm’s
market value is associated with the recently concluded deal.
C. Drug Development Success Rates
In the gains-from-trademodel, deals are signed only if the expected value
of the drug is greater if codeveloped than developed independently. In the
signaling model, deals are signed only if biotech firms reimburse phar-
maceutical firms for information costs. Thus, in these models, there is no
lemons problem: biotech companies cannot dump their inferior products
on pharmaceutical firms. We test this by examining whether drugs that
biotech firms develop in alliances are as likely to advance to the next
development stage as drugs they develop independently.
The probability a drug will advance to the next development stage is a
function of the quality of the drug, the effort exerted by the company or
companies involved in the development, and the experience of the com-
panies involved. We assume the probability that drug i originated by
company jwill complete a human trial (A = 1), conditional on beginning
the trial, is a function of drug characteristics ðXiÞ, the characteristics of
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the involved firm or firms ðFjÞ, and an indicator variable ðDiÞ that equals
1 if the drug is being developed in an alliance:
PrðAij ¼ 1Þ ¼
expðj0 þ j1Xi þ j2Fjt þ j3DiÞ
1þ expðj0 þ j1Xi þ j2Fjt þ j3DiÞ
ð6Þ
A negative coefficient for j3 is consistent with a lemons problem in the
market for deals or moral hazard, if each firm in an alliance invests subop-
timal effort because it shares the benefits of their investment with the partner
firm. A positive coefficient for j3 is consistent with either no asymmetric
information and moral hazard or asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems that are overwhelmed by the positive benefits of codevelopment.
We perform three separate logit regressions for drugs that begin
phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3, where the dependent variable is 1 if a drug
completes the trial, and 0 otherwise.We include 13 indicator variables for
the drug’s therapeutic class. Asymmetric information is likely to be most
severe for small, relatively new biotech firms. We include in equation (6)
separate indicator variables for companies that originated three or fewer
drugs during our sample period, between 4 and 24 drugs, and 25 or more
drugs. We also include interaction terms between the firm-size indicators
and the codevelopment indicator (Di).
15
Some of the drugs are censored, since we do not observe the ter-
mination of projects; rather, we observe whether a drug advances to the
next phase. Drugs that had not been launched by 2000, the final obser-
vation period in our data set, are right censored. To address this cen-
soring, we calculate themaximum length of time required for drugs in our
sample to complete each development stage (5 years for phase 1, 5 years
for phase 2, and 4 years for phase 3). Drugs that are right censored and
started a stage beyond these time periods are assumed to have failed
(coded as zero); right-censored drugs that started a phase within these
time periods are omitted from the regressions rather than coded as zero.
IV. Data
We use data from four major sources. The Windhover Database of Stra-
tegic Alliances contains information on pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology deals. It records information on all strategic alliance deals signed
by biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies between 1991 and
2000, to the extent that information is publicly available. The depen-
dent variable in our analysis of deal payments is defined as the total
potential precommercial payments from the licensor (biotech firm) to the
15. In the regression, we omit the codevelopment indicator and include the three firm-
size indicators and the interactions of the codevelopment indicator and the three firm-
size indicators.
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licensee (pharmaceutical firm).16 Potential refers to the scenario where
all scientific milestones are achieved. As mentioned in the previous
section, this measure of the deal price overstates expected precommercial
payments because it assumes contingent milestone and sponsored re-
search payments are paid with certainty. Furthermore, equity investments
by the licensee are included in the deal price, although one could argue
that the licensor gives up an equally valued asset in return, ownership in
its firm. On the other hand, our measure of deal price underestimates the
expected postcommercial payments to the selling firm because royalty
payments are excluded.
Since the Windhover database includes all types of alliances but our
theory applies to codevelopment deals, we apply a set of criteria to select
single-product deals with an R&D component. Specifically, we exclude
comarketing deals that are signed after a compound has been developed,
transactions that involve multiple products or acquisitions of research
divisions or entire companies,17 and deals for platform technologies that
may produce multiple compounds (e.g., access to a genomics database).
These criteria yield 539 deals that have nonmissing values for the pre-
commercial deal price as well as the other independent variables.
Windhover classifies each firm into a specific industry group (e.g., gene
therapy, pharmaceutical, in-vitro diagnostics) according to its principal
type of product. We create a biologic indicator variable that takes on the
value of 1 for drugs developed by firms that focus on large molecules or
antibodies.18 Deal prices for biologics could be relatively low, all else
equal, since biologics are generally more expensive to manufacture than
chemical compounds and pharmaceutical firms are less likely to have
a comparative advantage relative to biotech firms with biologics than
chemical compounds. On the other hand, deal prices for biologics could
be relatively high because biologics tend to have higher prices and are less
likely to face generic competition than chemical compounds.19 Finally,
we create a set of 19 indicator variables for the therapeutic category of the
16. This figure includes upfront payments, sponsored research payments (usually a fixed
amount per Ph.D. scientist assigned to perform research on the drug in question), invest-
ments in the licensor firm’s equity, and potential milestone payments if designated events are
achieved (e.g., initial phase 3 trial). Post-commercial royalty payments that the licensee may
receive once the drug actually reaches the market are not included in the pre-commercial
deal price.
17. Discovery-stage deals often involve a family of compounds where there is a single
lead product. We include these deals in the analytic sample.
18. We considered two alternative definitions of a biologic: (1) drugs developed by com-
panies thatWindhover classifies as being ‘‘biotech’’ firms (87% of the deals in our sample) and
(2) drugs developed by firms that focus on large molecules, antibodies, gene therapy, cell
therapy, carbohydrates, genomics, liposomes, nonotechnology, gene transcription, or synthe-
sis technologies (53% of the deals in our sample). We believe these alternative measures
overstate the number of biologics in the sample.
19. There are no generic biologics in the United States, but some biologics (e.g., insulin)
are facing generic competition in Europe and other countries.
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drug compound (e.g., gastrointestinal drugs), based onWindhover’s mod-
ification of the World Health Organization (WHO) codes.
Sample means and standard deviations are reported in table 1. The
mean precommercial deal value is $29.3 million in 1996 dollars, with a
maximum deal value in our data set of $457 million. The standard de-
viation of deal price is larger than the mean, which indicates there is
considerable variation and right skewness in the deal price distribution.
The majority of deals are signed when the compound is still in the
preclinical stage (which includes the discovery stage for this analysis),
and in 95% of deals, the licensor is a biotech company. The majority of
deals were also the first ever for the biotech companies, which is not
surprising because many biotech companies were founded in the 1980s
and went public in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
We report mean deal values by development stage in table 2. Deal
prices increase monotonically by stage; firms out-licensing drug com-
pounds in phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3 receive deal prices slightly larger
than in early-stage deals. Since this total precommercial payment mea-
sure is not adjusted for risk or the time value of money, this trend by deal
phase suggests that later-stage deals involve either greater retention of
responsibilities for the seller or greater seller bargaining power.
TABLE 1 Sample Means and Standard Deviations (n = 539)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Precommercial value of the deal ($ millions)
a
29.300 37.100
Development stage of compound at time of deal:
Preclinical .616 .487
Phase 1 .079 .270
Phase 2 .121 .327
Phase 3 .147 .354
First deal for seller .610 .488
Second deal for seller .180 .384
First deal for seller signed after preclinical phase .202 .402
Seller retains rights to
U.S. market .252 .434
Japanese market .270 .444
Deal includes an equity investment .472 .500
Reverse licensing deal .026 .158
Log(public and private equity raised by biotech
companies) in year prior to deal, $ millions 4.680 .645
Seller’s enterprise value (market value of equity + book
value of debt) in year prior to deal, $ millions
b
2,216 11,527
Seller’s enterprise value is missing .333 .413
Buyer’s enterprise value in year prior to deal, $ millions
c
10,782 21,982
Buyer’s enterprise value is missing .218 .470
a Precommercial deal value is the sum of the up-front payments, sponsored research payments (usually
an amount per scientist assigned to the compound), milestone payments, and equity investments.
b The mean presented for the seller’s enterprise value is for the subset of 360 publicly traded firms
whose financial data are recorded by Compustat.
c The mean presented for the buyer’s enterprise value is for the subset of 421 publicly traded firms
whose financial data are recorded by Compustat.
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We use Adis International R&D Insight Database to analyze the per-
formance of drugs in clinical trials. Adis collects information on all drugs
under active development by the international pharmaceutical and bio-
tech industries, including the compound’s generic name, company name,
current development stage and development history, a description of
adverse events and clinical trials, World Health Organization therapeutic
indication categories (e.g., nervous system drugs), and launch dates by
country for approved drugs.
Financial information on public biotech and pharmaceutical compa-
nies is available from Compustat. We collected information on the en-
terprise value of the buying and selling companies in the year prior to the
deal. For companies that were private at the time of the deal but have
since gone public, we used the Recombinant Capital RDNA database to
obtain the postmoney value of company at the round of venture capital
financing immediately prior to the deal in question. Since biotech firms
carry little debt, the postmoney value of private companies should be
analogous to the enterprise value of public biotech companies. In our
sample, buyer firms are about five times larger than sellers on average, as
measured by market capitalization. The total amount of public and pri-
vate equity capital that biotech firms raised for each year between 1988
and 2000 was obtained from several sources.
Recombinant Capital recorded the financing history of over 550 bio-
tech firms from the time of their first venture capital investment through
their IPO, if it had occurred by July 2001. This information is from
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings when the company
goes public or acquires another firm. Our sample, therefore, does not
include biotech firms that went out of business before going public or
being acquired.
V. Results
A. Determinants of Deal Values
In table 3, we report coefficient estimates of the determinants of deal
prices. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total potential pre-
commercial payments from the buyer-pharmaceutical firm to the seller-
biotech, measured in thousands of 1996 dollars. In the first specification,
we include drug characteristics only (indicator variables for therapeutic
TABLE 2 Number of Deals and Deal Payments by Development Stage
Preclinical Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Mean observed deal payment
(millions of 1996 dollars) $27.00 $29.40 $37.70 $33.00
Number of deals 334 43 66 80
Source: Windhover Database.
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category and indicator variables for the compound’s development stage).
Of the 19 coefficients on the therapeutic category indicator variables
(gastrointestinal, dermatology, and dental), 3 are significantly lower at the
10% level than for other compounds (coefficients not shown in table 3).
Compounds can be assigned to multiple therapeutic categories, so there is
no single omitted category. When the selling firm retains the right to
develop and sell the drug in theUnited States, it receives a 26% lower price
(exp(0.306)  1) than if it grants the buyer worldwide rights. This is
slightly lower than the U.S. share of total world pharmaceutical sales,
which is around 40%. Deal payments for biologics are 27% lower than for
nonbiologics, which is consistent with the perception that the manufac-
turing process for biologics is relatively complex and expensive or phar-
maceutical firms have relatively little experience developing biologics and
therefore add relatively little value to such an alliance. The coefficients on
the phase-2 and phase-3 indicator variables are positive and significant.
In the second specification of table 3, we add information on the deal
structure (e.g., whether the deal included an investment by the buyer in
the selling firm’s equity), the experience of the selling firm, and the op-
portunity cost of alternative financing, measured by total biotech equity
financing in the year preceding the deal. We include two variables to
measure the seller’s experience: an indicator that equals 1 if this is the
firm’s first deal and an indicator that equals 1 if this is the firm’s second
TABLE 3 Coefficient Estimates on the Determinants of Deal Values
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Stage of drug at time of deal:
Phase 1 .053 .238 .095 .236 .344 .288
Phase 2 .601** .208 .549** .206 .941** .254
Phase 3 .388** .189 .372** .187 .783** .244
Seller maintains rights to
U.S. market .306* .182 .293 .180 .275 .179
Japanese market .211 .179 .174 .177 .179 .176
Biologic .311** .155 .356** .154 .368** .153
Biotech equity raised, t  1 .017 .099 .030 .098
First deal for seller .631** .160 .366* .188
Second deal for seller .334* .202 .310 .201
First deal for seller and deal signed
in phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3 .701** 0.268
Constant 9.51** .211 9.91** .556 9.68** .560
N 539 539 539
R2 .07 .150 .170
Notes.—The dependent variable is log (precommercial deal value in $000s), which includes up-front
payments, sponsored research payments (usually an amount per scientist assigned to the compound),
milestone payments, and equity investments. Nineteen indicator variables are included for the therapeu-
tic category of the compound, using codes that Windhover adapted from the World Health Organization
codes. We omit the indicator variable for deals signed when the compound was in the discovery or
preclinical stage of development. Indicator variables are also included for deals that included an equity
investment and for reverse licensing deals (except in column 1).
**Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level; * significantly different from 0 at the 10% level.
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deal (two or more prior deals is the omitted variable). Firms negotiating
their first deal receive payments that are 47% lower ($26.9 million), on
average, than firms with at least two prior deals.20 This discount for
inexperience declines to 28% ($16.3 million) for the second deal.21 The
coefficient on the first-deal variable is significantly different from zero at
the 1% level, whereas the coefficient on the second deal variable is sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10% level. These results suggest that
pharmaceutical firms incur substantial search costs. As shown later, the
value of the signal to biotech firms ($19.5 million in the first-difference
specification of table 6) is substantial, although smaller than the implicit
payment these firms make for producing the information.
An alternative explanation for the negative coefficients on the first- and
second-deal variables is that, as biotech firms learn, the incremental value
of codeveloping a drug with a pharmaceutical firm decreases. If pharma-
ceutical firms capture these synergies due to negotiating power, then deal
payments are relatively small for inexperienced biotech firms. The two
explanations need not be mutually exclusive; deal payments might in-
crease with the seller’s experience due to both learning and signaling. We
need more specific data on the rights and responsibilities of the companies
involved in the alliances to separately measure these two effects.
Prices for phase-2 and phase-3 deals are 73% and 45% higher, re-
spectively, than for deals where the compound is in the discovery or
preclinical stage (the omitted category), controlling for drug and deal
characteristics. Since we expect total potential precommercial payments
to be invariant by stage of deal, the increase in deal prices for phase-2 and
phase-3 deals is consistent with biotech firms taking on greater respon-
sibilities in later-stage deals (and, therefore, being reimbursed at a higher
rate from the buyer), higher unobserved quality of late-stage products, or
greater bargaining power by biotech companies on later-stage drugs due
to a relatively small number of sellers. The coefficient on the index of
biotech funds raised from the equity markets is insignificant.
In the third column of table 3, we include an indicator variable if the
selling firm is signing its first deal and the deal is signed in a clinical phase
(phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3). The coefficient on this variable is negative
and large, and the coefficients on the phase-1, phase-2, and phase-3
development-stage indicators are larger than before. A biotech firm sign-
ing its first deal in the discovery or preclinical phase receives payments
20. Since the dependent variable has been logarithmically transformed, to estimate the mag-
nitude of the first-deal discount in dollars, we use the regression coefficients from table 3 to
calculate expðgXþ 0:5s2" Þ, separately for companies that are signing their first deal and those
that have already signed at least two deals (Manning 1998). The term s2" refers to the estimated
ordinary least squares residual variance.
21. We also tried a specification including indicator variables for three and four prior
deals, but these coefficients were insignificant.
1455Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances
This content downloaded from 165.123.111.89 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 17:11:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
#05507 UCP: JB article # 780410
that are an estimated $13.2 million lower than a firm that has already
signed at least two deals. By contrast, a biotech signing its first deal in a
clinical stage experiences a much larger discount of $39.7 million rela-
tive to an experienced biotech firm.
These results are consistent with scenarios 2 and 3 of the signaling
model, where biotech firms with low-quality products cannot afford
to reimburse a pharmaceutical firm for information costs until the later
development stages, when the costs are relatively low. The small deal
payments to inexperienced firms for phase-1, phase-2, and phase-3
drugs, relative to firms that have already signed alliances, reflects the low
quality of the drugs. This poor quality is unobserved to us but inferred by
prospective buyers, because the biotech firm was unable to sign a deal
earlier in the drug’s development.
In table 4, we add firm-specific financial information on the sellers and
buyers to further examine whether liquidity constraints or bargaining
power affects deal payments. The coefficient on the seller’s enterprise
value is positive, as expected, but not significant. The coefficient on the
indicator variable for selling firms with missing financial information,
which are predominantly private biotech companies and small public
biotechs, is also insignificant. The coefficient on the equity index is po-
sitive but insignificant, as before. Thus, we find little evidence that
the status of the equity markets affects deal payments, even for small
TABLE 4 Coefficient Estimates on the Determinants of Deal Values
Coefficient Standard Error
Stage of drug at time of deal:
Phase 1 .12 .23
Phase 2 .454** .20
Phase 3 .346* .19
Seller maintains rights to
U.S. market .21 .18
Japanese market .11 .17
First deal for seller .571** .16
Second deal for seller .25 .20
Biotech equity raised, t  1 .04 .10
Seller’s enterprise value, t  1 .01 .01
Indicator if missing enterprise value for seller .16 .14
Buyer’s enterprise value, t  1 .0178** .00
Indicator if missing enterprise value for buyer .380** .13
Constant 9.13** .56
N 539
R2 .21
Notes.—The dependent variable is log(precommercial deal value in $000s). Nineteen indicator var-
iables are included for the therapeutic category of the compound, using codes Windhover adapted from
the World Health Organization) codes. We omit the indicator variable for deals signed when the com-
pound was in the discovery or preclinical stage of development. Indicator variables are also included
for deals that include an equity investment and for reverse licensing deals. Buyer and seller enterprise
values are measured in $ billions.
**Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level; * significantly different from 0 at the 10% level.
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biotechs that are more likely to be cash constrained. Combining these
results with those fromLerner and Tsai (2000), this suggests that liquidity
constraints lead to adjustment in rights transferred rather than in the price
paid for those rights, contrary to what might be expected under the
efficient-markets hypothesis.
The coefficient on the buying firm’s enterprise value is positive and
significant, implying that large pharmaceutical firms pay more to in-
license compounds than small firms. A $1 billion increase in a buyer’s
market capitalization is associated with a 1.8% increase in the deal pay-
ment. This result is consistent with the presence of economies of scale
and scope in R&D that allow larger pharmaceutical firms to outbid
smaller firms when in-licensing compounds. It may also reflect unob-
served quality, if larger firms bid only for those products that have rela-
tively large expected revenues. In this specification, deal payments for
phase-2 drugs were 45% larger than for preclinical drugs. As before, we
interpret this increased payment as evidence that the selling firm takes
greater responsibility in the subsequent development of the drug.
B. Effect of Deals on the Valuation of Firms
If alliances with pharmaceutical firms allow private biotech firms to sig-
nal the quality of the firm’s product pipeline and management to ven-
ture capitalists, then alliances are predicted to cause an increase in the
market value of a firm.We present some descriptive data in table 5 on the
venture capital financing history and initial public offerings of 566 bio-
tech firms. Biotech firms typically raise several rounds of private equity
before going public or being acquired. As displayed in the final column of
table 5, 58% of the biotech firms raised between three and five rounds of
private equity.
The mean market value of a biotech firm after its first round of venture
capital financing was $11.1 million, and the value more than doubled by
the second financing round (second column of table 5). Values continue
TABLE 5 Alliance Activity and Private and Public Market Valuation of Biotech
Firms (n = 566)
Financing Round
Biotech Firms That
Signed a Deal
before the Round
Mean Valuation
after Financing
($millions)
Biotech Firms for
Whom This Is the Final
Venture Capital Round
1 1.2% $11.1 11.7%
2 3.2% $26.3 14.6%
3 5.1% $42.7 21.2%
4 7.8% $55.3 20.3%
5 10.7% $68.0 17.3%
6 11.8% $84.3 7.3%
7–9 12.3% $120.2 7.7%
Initial public offering 15.70% $162.2
Source: Recombinant Capital.
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to grow between venture capital rounds, although at decreasing rates in
percentage terms. Three-quarters of these 566 firms had gone public by
2001. As reported in the first column of table 5, few biotech firms had
signed any deals prior to their first financing round. By the time of the
IPO, about one-sixth of the biotech firms had formed at least one alliance.
If deals function as quality signals, therefore, they are probably not the
only signalingmechanism. Of the 90 firms that signed a deal prior to their
IPO, 82% signed one deal only, 10% signed two deals, and only 8%
signed three or more deals.
We present the valuation regression results in table 6. In the first spec-
ification, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm’s value at
the conclusion of a financing round, measured in millions of dollars.22
Valuations at each venture capital round and the IPO, if it occurred, are
pooled together. We adjust the standard errors to allow the error terms
to be correlated within a firm across the different financing rounds.23
TABLE 6 Impact of Deals on Biotech Venture Capital and Initial Public
Offering Valuations
Dependent variable
Log(Company Valuen)
After Financing Round n
Log(Valuen) 
Log(Valuen1)
Biotech had signed 1 deal prior to
financing round n .380** (.0720)
Biotech had signed 2 or more deals
prior to financing round n .392** (.1680)
Biotech signed its first deal between
round n  1 and round n .232** (.0817)
Biotech signed a deal between round
n  1 and round n, and it was not
its first deal .1070 (.1240)
Second venture capital round .963** (.0420)
Third venture capital round 1.51** (.0550) .404** (.0480)
Fourth venture capital round 1.76** (.0670) .609** (.0550)
Fifth–ninth venture capital round 2.04** (.0820) .746** (.0490)
Initial public offering 2.59** (.0640) .211** (.0540)
Months between financing rounds .0011 (.0014)
Constant 1.76** (.0770) 0.984** (.0600)
Observations 2,477 1,883
R2 .59 .17
Note.—The dependent variable in the first specification is the logarithm of a company’s postmoney
valuation after a round of venture capital financing or in an initial public offering, measured in millions
of dollars. The dependent variable in the second specification is the difference in the logarithm of the
company’s postmoney valuation between subsequent rounds of venture capital financing or between
the final venture capital round and the IPO, also measured in millions of dollars. We include a set of in-
dicators for the year of the financing and the financing round (the first venture capital round is omitted
in the first specification, and the change in value between the first and second venture capital rounds is
omitted in the second specification). We adjust the standard errors to allow error terms to be correlated
within a firm over financing rounds.
**Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level; * significantly different from 0 at the 10% level.
22. Deal prices are converted to 1996 dollars using the producer price index.
23. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2002) show that failing to correct for serial corre-
lation in the error terms can bias downward the standard errors when difference-in-difference
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Biotech firms that signed a single deal received valuations that were
46.2% higher, and biotech firms that signed two or more deals received
valuations that were 48.0% higher, on average, than firms that had not yet
signed a deal (the omitted variable). Based on these results, the estimated
valuation premium associated with signing a deal is $20.2 million.24 We
cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the one-deal and two-
plus-deal coefficients are equal, which suggests that one deal is sufficient
to signal a biotech firm’s quality. With symmetric information, a biotech
company’s second deal should not affect its value because the deal pay-
ment is commensurate with the value of the assets exchanged.
The coefficient on the second venture capital round variable indicates
that the value of biotech firms at the end of the second financing round are
162% higher than in the first round (the omitted round), on average.
Values increase monotonically over the subsequent private equity rounds
and the IPO. We control for the year of financing but do not report the
coefficients in table 6. Market values increased substantially in the late
1990s and in 2000. Relative to 1991, biotech valuations were 35% higher
in real terms in 1997, 51% higher in 1998, 109% higher in 1999, and
224% higher in 2000.
The second column of table 6 presents results of the first-difference
valuation regression (as described by equation [5]). Time-invariant char-
acteristics that are correlated with a firm’s value drop out of the first-
difference specification, sowe should obtain amore precisemeasure of the
incremental signal value of a deal. A biotech firm signing its first deal
experiences an estimated 26.2% increase in value, on average, at its sub-
sequent financing round relative to biotech firms that did not sign a deal
in the interim. This result increases our confidence that the step-up in a
biotech firm’s market value can be attributed to the relatively recent deal
signing. The coefficient from the first-difference specification is smaller
than the estimated impact of deals from the cross-section regression
but still significantly different from zero and economically meaningful.
Based on the preferred estimate from the first-difference specification
and the sample mean biotech valuation ($74.4 million), a biotech firm
receives an estimated $19.5 million higher valuation due to the alliance’s
signal. The coefficient on a deal other than the biotech firm’s first deal is
positive but insignificant, which is consistent with the cross-section re-
gression where the coefficients on the first-deal and two-plus-deal vari-
ables are essentially the same. This implies that it takes only one deal to
signal a biotech firm’s quality to private investors. Only 16 deals in our
models are estimated with ordinary least squares. These authors also show that our method of
adjusting the standard errors generally removes most of the bias when the number of groups is
large, as is the casewith our 562 firms.Hausman andKuersteiner (2003) show that, under certain
circumstances, feasible generalized least squares are more efficient than ordinary least squares.
24. This estimate is for a third round of venture capital financing that occurred in 1991.
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data are by firms that have already signed a deal, so the lack of signifi-
cance may be due to a small sample.
These results are consistent with scenarios 2 and 3 of our model, where
pharmaceutical firms sign codevelopment deals with high-quality bio-
tech firms only. The signal from the deal allows high-quality and low-
quality firms to be valued appropriately by venture capitalists. The $19.5
million premium associated with a deal measures the difference in the
value of a high- and low-quality firm ðVFH  VFL Þ, once investors can
distinguish the two quality types.We cannot rule out scenario 1, however,
where all biotech companies sign deals and venture capitalists infer the
quality of firms from the magnitude of the deal payments. In this latter
scenario, the coefficient on the deal variables in table 6 indicate that more
high- than low-quality firms sign deals, or the magnitude of the under-
valuation in the previous pooling equilibrium exceeds the magnitude of
the overvaluation.
The results from the valuation analysis suggest that gains from trade in
codevelopment is not the sole rationale for deals. If it were, and if venture
capitalists anticipated that firms would enter into deals when deals are
efficient, the realization of such alliances would have no effect on firm
valuations. Our valuation analysis focuses on private biotech firms be-
cause that is where we think information asymmetry problems might be
particularly acute.
C. Postdeal Performance
If biotech firms exploit their informational advantage to out-license low-
quality drugs, then drugs that are codeveloped should be less likely to
advance (Pisano 1997). This possible information asymmetry is an al-
ternative explanation for our finding that biotechs receive discounted
payments on their first deal. Conversely, if pharmaceutical firms can dis-
tinguish high- and low-quality drugs, then drugs that are codeveloped
should be just as likely to advance as those developed independently.
Finally, if there are benefits of codevelopment (the gains-from-trade
model) or if only high-quality drugs are out-licensed (scenarios 2 and 3 of
the signaling model), then drugs that are codeveloped should be more
likely to advance than those developed independently.
In table 7, we present selected coefficient estimates from three dif-
ferent logit regressions using the Adis database of drugs under devel-
opment. The first regression includes all drugs that began a phase 1 trial.
Each observation is a condition for which a drug is being tested, so there
may be multiple observations for a particular drug. The dependent var-
iable takes the value 1 if phase 1 is completed and a phase-2 trial is
initiated for the condition in question, and 0 otherwise. To control for firm
experience, we include separate indicator variables for companies that
originated three or fewer drugs during the sample period (1991–2000),
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TABLE 7 Logit Coefficient Estimates for the Determinants of R&D Success
Dependent Variable: 1 if Completed Phase
Sample Drugs That Started Phase 1 Drugs That Started Phase 2 Drugs That Started Phase 3
Small company is originator (omitted group: nonindustrialized source):
Developed independently .221 (.251) .371 (.230) 1.52** (.311)
Codeveloped .466* (.264) .734** (.217) 1.34** (.294)
Medium-sized company is originator:
Developed independently .323 (.230) .724** (.220) 1.01** (.277)
Codeveloped 1.22** (0.257) 1.35** (.209) 1.19** (.245)
Large company is originator:
Developed independently .551** (.223) .513** (.203) .505* (.259)
Codeveloped 1.13** (.244) .832** (.189) 0.666** (0.223)
Constant 1.13** (.220) .529** (.184) 0.697** (.218)
Psuedo-R2 .08 .09 .14
N 2,392 1,579 1,083
Marginal effect of codevelopment on probability of advancing for a
Small firm .041 .171 .302
Medium-sized firm .125 .310 .288
Note.—Observations are specific conditions for which a drug is being developed to treat. Dependent variable is 1 if a drug advanced to the subsequent development stage or was
approved by the FDA. The logit regressions include 13 indicators for the therapeutic category of the compound. Standard errors are in parentheses. To address right censoring, we
calculate the maximum length of time it took for a drug to complete each development stage (5 years for phase 1, 5 years for phase 2, and 4 years for phase 3). Drugs that were
censored and had started a stage within these time periods were omitted from the regressions; drugs that were censored and had started a stage beyond these time periods were
assumed to have failed. Small companies originated 3 or fewer drugs during our sample period (1991–2000); medium-sized companies originated between 4 and 24 drugs; and
large companies originated 25 or more drugs.
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level; ** significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.
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between 4 and 24 drugs, and 25 or more drugs.25 Biotech firms are in the
small- or medium-sized category whereas most pharmaceutical firms are
in the largest category. Drugs that were originated by a nonindustrialized
source, which is usually a university, are the omitted group. We interact
the three indicator variables for firm experience with an indicator variable
if the drug is being codeveloped. Recall that a majority of deals in our
data set (61%) represent the first deal signed by a biotech company, so
most of the alliances involve inexperienced biotech firms.
In the first column, the three coefficients on the codevelopment inter-
action variables are positive and significant; compounds being developed
through an alliance are more likely to complete phase-1 trials than com-
pounds developed independently by small, medium, or large firms. These
coefficients are also economically meaningful. A drug originated by a
medium-sized firm that is codeveloped has a probability of completing a
phase-1 trial that is an estimated 12.5 percentage points higher than an
otherwise similar drug developed independently (marginal effects of co-
development are reported in the bottom rows of table 7). Thus contrary to
Pisano (1997), we find no evidence that biotech firms use their infor-
mational advantage to out-license relatively unattractive compounds. Our
results are consistentwith a situationwhere low-quality drugs are less likely
to be out-licensed because their parent firms cannot reimburse pharma-
ceutical firms for the information costs (scenarios 2 and 3 of the signaling
model) or the collaboration improves the likelihood a drug will advance.
The last two columns of table 7 report similar logit regressions for
drugs that began phase-2 and phase-3 clinical trials. The dependent var-
iable in each specification is 1 if the drug successfully completed that
single stage. As before, the coefficients on the codevelopment interac-
tions are positive and significant. The predicted probability that a drug
originated by a small firm and developed jointly with another company
will complete phase-2 and phase-3 trials is 17 and 30 percentage points
higher, respectively, than a drug the firm originates and develops indepen-
dently. We find no evidence, therefore, that the lower payments accepted
by inexperienced biotech companies are due to the greater scientific risk
of the product.
VI. Conclusions
The analysis in this paper sheds light on several hypotheses regarding
the effects of buyer and seller characteristics, liquidity constraints, and
asymmetric information in the market for biotech-pharmaceutical deals.
25. The experience thresholds we use to define small, medium, and large firms are ar-
bitrary but they do divide the sample of compounds into three approximately equal-sized
groups. The results are qualitatively similar if we define small, medium, and large firms as
those that have originated 5 or fewer drugs, between 6 and 29 drugs, and 30 or more drugs,
respectively.
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We find that biotechnology companies receive a 47% discount for their
first deal and a 28% discount for their second deal and that these discounts
are not consistent with the drugs’ postdeal performance. These discounts
are consistent with a model where deals signal the selling firm’s asset
and managerial quality to equity markets. Pharmaceutical companies
are plausibly better able to evaluate biotech companies than pure finan-
cial intermediaries. The discounted payments accepted by inexperienced
biotech firms represent implicit payments to reimburse the pharmaceu-
tical company for information costs. Since a pharmaceutical company
takes not only an equity stake in a small firm but also acquires rights to the
assets, the pharmaceutical firm may have stronger incentives to invest
optimally in information gathering than a venture capitalist that takes
only a partial and temporary equity share. The fact that drugs in biotech-
pharmaceutical alliances perform better in subsequent trials than products
developed solely in-house by biotech or pharmaceutical firms confirms
that codevelopment adds sufficient value to outweigh any moral hazard
problems that result from sharing development responsibilities. These
findings are inconsistent with the lemons hypothesis, that biotech com-
panies are able to out-license their least promising drugs. Our finding that
the discount for first deals does not decline or disappear for later-stage
drugs, when more objective information is available, provides further
evidence against the lemons hypothesis.
Although biotech companies take a substantial discount on their first
deal, this nevertheless appears to be rational, because a deal with a phar-
maceutical company sends a positive signal to prospective investors.
We find that biotech firms that have signed a deal receive substantially
higher valuations from venture capitalists and other investors at subse-
quent financing rounds. Themagnitude of this premium ($19.5million in
the preferred first-difference specification) offsets most of the discounted
deal payments accepted by inexperienced biotech firms ($26.9 million).
This evidence of positive effects of deals on subsequent financing is
more consistent with the signaling model than with the simple gains-
from-trade model. However, the fact that even established biotech firms
continue to do deals suggests that deals can provide a means to take
advantage of differing expertise to increase real productivity, as well as
their information-producing, signaling function.
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